Security Posture Rules

Source-agnostic by design. Every rule here is a statement about AWS Terraform only. This file contains no GCP/Heroku/source-cloud logic — the consuming skill (the caller) owns all source-specific concerns and passes the caller-context signals a rule needs (see below).

Rule categories

• Gate-enforced — the read-only policy gate (scripts/validate-terraform-policy.py) statically verifies these after generation: ALB TLS, no-public-database, RDS + ElastiCache encryption-at-rest, no-public-DB-port ingress, no-public admin/datastore-port ingress, no-wildcard-IAM. Each is fail-open on ambiguity — fires only on unambiguous in-block literal evidence, so a valid stack is never falsely blocked.
• Authoring-only — best-practice rules the static gate cannot check but the caller must still emit: deletion_protection, the master-password-via-Secrets-Manager recipe, S3 hardening, EKS/ECR settings, private-subnet placement, backups, and the compliance-conditional emissions below. Not gate-blocked; still required for well-formed output.

Caller-context signals

A few rules are conditional on facts only the caller knows. The caller passes these when it loads this file; the rules reference them abstractly (never a source-cloud artifact):

• compliance — the set of declared compliance frameworks (soc2, pci, hipaa, fedramp), or empty. Gates the Compliance-conditional emissions section. The caller derives this from its own requirements gathering and supplies the value; this file only says “if compliance includes X, emit Y.”
• aws_config values (instance classes, CPU/memory, sizes) — the caller reads these from its own design artifact and populates resource attributes; the posture rules constrain the shape, not the specific numbers.

The caller also owns any source-cloud detection (e.g. mapping a public-ingress finding from the source infra into a warning) — that logic never lives here.

Internet-facing ALB — TLS termination and HTTP redirect

Applies when: an aws_lb is an internet-facing Application load balancer — internal = false, omitted, or variable-driven (treated as internet-facing, fail-safe). Exempt: internal ALBs (internal = true), and Network (L4) / Gateway (L3) load balancers (load_balancer_type = "network" or "gateway") — these front raw TCP/UDP and legitimately have no HTTPS:443 listener.

Rules:

1. Emit an HTTPS listener on port 443 (protocol = "HTTPS") with a modern ssl_policy, a certificate_arn, and a forward default action to the app target group.
2. Emit an HTTP listener on port 80 whose default action is a redirect to HTTPS (HTTP_301) — never a forward to targets.
3. The ALB security group allows 443 from the internet and 80 only for the redirect; never forward plaintext HTTP to targets. Target groups may use HTTP to the tasks behind the ALB — TLS terminates at the ALB.

Reference HCL (emit whenever aws_lb is internet-facing):

Gate mapping: rule 1 → alb_https_listener; rule 2 → alb_http_redirect (see scripts/validate-terraform-policy.py). If generated Terraform lacks the HTTPS listener or forwards HTTP, that is a generation defect the caller must fix — not a reason to draw or ship plaintext HTTP.

Managed database — no public exposure

Applies to: aws_db_instance, aws_rds_cluster.

Rules:

1. Never emit publicly_accessible = true. Place the database in private subnets and reach it from application security groups only. RDS defaults to false, so simply omitting the attribute is compliant.
2. Emit storage_encrypted = true — RDS storage defaults to unencrypted, so this must be explicit. Optionally set kms_key_id for a customer-managed key.

Gate mapping: rule 1 → rds_not_public; rule 2 → rds_encryption_at_rest. The gate fires only on a literal publicly_accessible = true / missing-or-false storage_encrypted; a variable-driven value fails open (not flagged). S3 is not checked — buckets have default SSE-S3 since Jan 2023, so a missing SSE block is not an unencrypted bucket.

ElastiCache — encryption

Applies to: aws_elasticache_replication_group and Redis-engine aws_elasticache_cluster.

Rule:

• aws_elasticache_replication_group: set at_rest_encryption_enabled = true (and consider transit_encryption_enabled = true). ElastiCache does not encrypt at rest by default.
• aws_elasticache_cluster in the Redis single-node form (engine = "redis", no replication_group_id): MUST set transit_encryption_enabled = true. Note that at_rest_encryption_enabled is NOT a valid argument on aws_elasticache_cluster (AWS provider schema) — at-rest encryption requires an aws_elasticache_replication_group. So the cluster form is gated on transit encryption; when at-rest is needed, emit a replication group instead. (This does NOT prescribe cluster-vs-replication-group for HA — that choice is deferred; when the cluster form is emitted, it must set transit encryption.)
• engine = "memcached" clusters remain exempt — Memcached does not support these attributes.

Gate mapping: elasticache_encryption_at_rest (replication group) and elasticache_cluster_encryption (Redis cluster). Both fire on missing-or-false; variable-driven values (and a variable-driven or absent engine) fail open. A Memcached aws_elasticache_cluster is exempt.

Database security group — no public ingress on DB ports

Applies to: inline ingress { ... } blocks inside aws_security_group.

Rule: an ingress rule covering a database port (5432 PostgreSQL, 3306 MySQL) must not allow 0.0.0.0/0 (in cidr_blocks) or ::/0 (in ipv6_cidr_blocks). Restrict to the application security group (security_groups = [...]) or a private CIDR.

Gate mapping: db_sg_no_public_ingress. The gate inspects only inline ingress blocks; separate aws_security_group_rule / aws_vpc_security_group_ingress_rule resources fail open (the static reader cannot correlate them to their security group), so prefer inline ingress where you want gate coverage.

Security group — no public admin / datastore ports

Applies to: inline ingress { ... } blocks inside aws_security_group.

Rule: an ingress rule must not open a well-known admin or datastore port to 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0. The enforced set is deliberately fixed to ports that are ~never legitimately public: 22 (SSH), 3389 (RDP), 6379 (Redis), 11211 (Memcached), 27017 (MongoDB), 9200/9300 (Elasticsearch), 5601 (Kibana). Reach these from a bastion/app security group or a private CIDR instead.

Gate mapping: sg_no_public_admin_ingress. Web ports (80/443) and application/game ports (e.g. high ranges) are not flagged — the rule targets a curated never-public list, not “any public ingress”, so legitimately-public workloads pass. Database ports (5432/3306) are handled by db_sg_no_public_ingress and excluded here to avoid double-reporting. Same inline-only fail-open scope as that rule.

Both security-group gates read cidr_blocks and ipv6_cidr_blocks as separate attributes and check each family’s “entire internet” range. On dual-stack and IPv6-only VPCs, ::/0 on an admin or database port is exactly as exposed as 0.0.0.0/0, so a benign IPv4 list does not excuse an open IPv6 list. The violation message names the range that actually fired.

Ranges are compared after canonicalisation, not as text: ::/0, ::0/0 and 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0/0 are the same range and all fire. terraform fmt treats a CIDR as an opaque string, so nothing else normalises these — and IPv6 has many more legal spellings of the zero address than IPv4. Only quoted literals inside the list count, and comments are stripped first, so a range named only in a comment (# TODO: was 0.0.0.0/0) is not an allowed range and does not fire. Non-literal values (var.x, ${...}) remain fail-open as documented above.

IAM — no wildcard permissions

Applies to: aws_iam_policy, aws_iam_role_policy, aws_iam_group_policy, aws_iam_user_policy.

Rule: an Allow statement must not use a sole wildcard for Action or Resource, in either string form ("*") or single-element list form (["*"]). Scope to specific actions and resource ARNs. A list that also contains scoped entries (e.g. ["s3:GetObject", ...]) is not a blanket wildcard and is allowed.

The narrow exception is an isolated elasticbeanstalk:CreateStorageLocation statement with Resource = "*". AWS does not define resource-level permissions for that action; combining it with any other action does not qualify for the exception.

Gate mapping: no_wildcard_iam. The gate scans literal policy JSON (heredoc or jsonencode({...})) in the resources above. aws_iam_policy_document data sources fail open (their statements are HCL blocks, not literal JSON the reader can inspect), and assume-role trust policies on aws_iam_role are out of scope — so a scoped data-source policy is never falsely flagged.

Authoring-only rules (not gate-enforced)

The static gate cannot verify these, but well-formed AWS Terraform must still emit them. Apply them at authoring time alongside the gate-enforced rules above.

Database — durability & credential hygiene

Applies to: aws_db_instance, aws_rds_cluster and their supporting resources.

1. deletion_protection = true by default. Add an inline comment: # Set to false only when intentionally destroying this cluster.

2. Backups enabled (backup_retention_period > 0).

3. Emit a DB subnet group + parameter group + security group; place the instance in private subnets.

4. Never set the master password from a plaintext variable (master_password = var.database_master_password is forbidden — it lands in terraform.tfvars and state in plaintext). Instead generate it into Secrets Manager and reference it via a data source:

   hclCopy

   resource "random_password" "db_master" {
     length  = 32
     special = true
   }
   
   resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "db_master" {
     name = "${var.project_name}/rds/master-credentials"
   }
   
   resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "db_master" {
     secret_id     = aws_secretsmanager_secret.db_master.id
     secret_string = jsonencode({ password = random_password.db_master.result })
   }
   
   data "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "db_master" {
     secret_id  = aws_secretsmanager_secret.db_master.id
     depends_on = [aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.db_master]
   }
   
   # on the instance/cluster:
   #   master_password = jsondecode(data.aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.db_master.secret_string)["password"]

S3 — bucket hardening

Applies to: application aws_s3_bucket resources (not log-sink buckets, which have their own policies).

1. Versioning enabled.
2. Encryption: SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS (a bucket without an explicit SSE block still has default SSE-S3 since Jan 2023 — do not treat its absence as unencrypted, but prefer an explicit block).
3. Block public access by default (account- and bucket-level).
4. Lifecycle policies for cost/retention where applicable.
5. If public content is required, front it with CloudFront + Origin Access Control (OAC) — never a public bucket policy.

Compute — Fargate / EKS / ECR

1. Fargate tasks run in private subnets; size from the caller-supplied aws_config CPU/memory.
2. EKS: default to a private API endpoint — endpoint_private_access = true, endpoint_public_access = false. Add a comment: # Public endpoint disabled. To enable kubectl access from outside the VPC set endpoint_public_access = true and restrict public_access_cidrs to known CIDRs.
3. ECR: every aws_ecr_repository includes image_scanning_configuration { scan_on_push = true } (free basic scanning catches known CVEs before images reach production).

Networking — subnet & egress baseline

1. Span at least 2 Availability Zones.
2. Public + private subnets; workloads (compute, database) live in private subnets.
3. NAT gateway for private-subnet outbound internet when required.

Monitoring — baseline observability

1. A CloudWatch log group per service with a sane retention (default 30 days).
2. A dashboard with key metrics. (Specific alarm thresholds come from the caller’s context — the caller supplies success-metric targets; this rule constrains the shape, not the values.)

Compliance-conditional emissions

These are AWS best-practice hardening steps that apply only when the caller declares a compliance framework. The rule lives here; the trigger (the compliance set) is a caller-context signal (see Caller-context signals above) — the caller passes it in; this file never reads a source-cloud artifact.

Apply based on the caller-supplied compliance set:

When compliance is empty, emit none of the above — keep the generated Terraform minimal and immediately applyable. (The account-hardening baseline.tf layer — CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Config, Security Hub — remains the caller’s own generation concern for now; it is a candidate to migrate here later.)